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stated by way of dictum that the parents' duty to support does not
necessarily end when the child becomes of age, the question being de-
termined by the facts.0 This case may be construed to overrule an
earlier Kentucky case" holding that a parent is not legally bound to
support a child after it becomes of legal age, and that no such obliga-
tion can be imposed by statute. Yet, if we are to give cognizance
to a very strong inference, even this early Kentucky case recognized
the common law duty to support at least until the child became of
legal age.
A New York statute5 provides a penalty for the abandonment in
destitute circumstances of a child under sixteen. Another New York
statute provides a heavier penalty in the case of such abandonment
of a child under fourteen. These provisions indicate a slight trend
in the law toward lifting the burden of support from the shoulders
of the parent. This trend is evidenced by the omissions in the stat-
utes of the states to provide penalties for nonsupport or abandonment
of children over sixteen years of age. The gap between the age of
sixteeen and legal age, however, is still filled by the common law,
making it a misdemeanor to commit such abandonment. Where injury
has or is being done the infant the law will act to punish,"4 or to
prescribe a remedy. 5 Where no harm is done, and, perhaps, the
infant is benefited by the cutting of parental bonds, the law will re-
main discreetly silent. 5
HOWARD H. WHrrEUAD.
EQUITY-EQUITABLE CONVERSION-OPTION CONTRACT-
DEATH OF VENDOR.
One Bisbee leased certain real estate to two lessees for a period
of two years, and gave these lessees an option to purchase the real
estate at any time within the two years upon the payment of a certain
sum. Almost a year later Bisbee died intestate. A month after Bis-
bee's death the lessees exercised their option to purchase. The prop-
erty was conveyed to the lessees by Bisbee's administrator, and the
purchase moifey was ordered to be, and was, distributed as personal
property. The heirs of Bisbee sought to have the order set aside.
Held: for the plaintiffs, who as heirs of Bisbee were entitled to the
'9Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S. W. 67 (1908).
"Commonwealth v. Willis' Exr., 7 Ky. Law Rep. 677 (1886).
"Cahill's Cons. Laws of N. Y., Ch. 41, Section 480.
" Cahill's Cons. Laws of N. Y., Ch. 41, Section 481.
"State v. Herring, 200 Iowa 1105, 205 N. W. 861 (1925); Com-
monwealth v. Donovan, 187 Ky. 779, 220 S. W. 1081 (1920).
'5Sprlngstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229 Pac. 14 (1924);
Sanderson v. Sanderson, 149 Misc. R. 88, 267 N. Y. Supp. 410 (1933).
IsHolland v. Hartley, 171 N. C. 376, 88 S. E. 507 (1916); Memphis
Steel Const. Co. v. Lister, 138 Tenn. 307, 197 S. W. 902 (1917); Cohen
v. Del. L. and W. Ry. Co., 150 Misc. 450, 269 N. Y. Supp. 667 (1934).
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purchase money, on the basis that the land which had devolved to
them as real estate was converted into personalty at the time of the
exercise of the option.' The court repudiated the doctrine of "rela-
tion back," as propounded in certain English cases.
This case represents a phase of the problem of equitable con-
version which, briefly stated, is this: Where there is made a contract
for the purchase of real estate, the land is converted into personalty
and the purchase money is to be treated as realty.
The very doctrine of equitable conversion assumes a specifically
enforceable contract.2 When there is a specifically enforceable con-
tract the party wishing to enforce the contract is deemed to own that
which he will receive if the contract may be, and is, specifically en-
forced.
The doctrine of equitable conversion has been extended to option
contracts. "Since the equitable conversion will result only from a
contract for the sale of land it is obvious that the mere giving of an
option will not work an equitable conversion. Since the rights of the
vendor and vendee are contingent, it will follow that according to
the doctrine of equitable conversion the nature of the property, which
is dependent upon those rights, will remain uncertain until the option
to exercised. If the option is never exercised, then an equitable con-
version will never take place. But upon the exercise of the option the
obligation of the vendor becomes fixed, and according to the doctrine
of equitable conversion the land is then converted into personalty In
the hands of the vendor, and into realty in the hands of the vendee."'
"The problem, however, is not so simple if the vendor dies pending
the exercise of the option. Until the exercise of the option the vendor's
heir Is of course entitled, both legally and equitably, to the property
as land. If, however the vendee exercises his option, he, because of
the principles of specific performance in equity, becomes equitably
entitled to the land and can compel a conveyance on payment of the
purchase price. The vendor's heir also must convey the property on
the exercise of the option, for the same reason that the purchaser
with notice, or the donee of property held subject to an option must
convey upon the exercise of the option."'
Of course the option contract need never be in fact specifically
enforced. The option which is exercised and so becomes a binding
contract effects the conversion 5
The leading case on the doctrine of equitable conversion in re-
gard to option contracts is the English case of Lawes v. Bennett,'
*Estate of Bisbee, 177 Wis. 77, 187 N. W. 653 (1922).
* Simpson, "Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Con-
version by Contract," 1935, 44 Yale L. J. 559, 563.
'Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913), 13 Col. L. R.
369, 376. See also Walsh, Equity (1930), p. 418.
'Stone, loc. cit., supra, note 3.
$Simpson, s8pra, note 2, at 564.
4 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 167 (Chancery 1785).
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which was followed by the court in Weeding v. Weeling.7 The doc-
trine of these cases has been phrased by Romer, L. J., as follows:
"Where an option has been given by a testator over part of his real
estate, then, whether given before or after the date of the will, that
real estate is to be treated for the purposes of devolution on death as
devolving from the date of the exercise of the option as proceedd of
sale and not as real estate."s The result is that the personal repre-
sentative is entitled to the purchase money, there having occurred an
equitable conversion of the land into personalty relating back to the
making or giving of the option.
One writer has said that the above statement of the doctrine really
could not -be based upon the two cases mentioned. He adds, that
even though the cases do stand for that proposition, the proposition
is not sound. Such opinion is merely the reflection of the holdings of
subsequent cases, and the opinions of many legal writers. The doc-
trine of Lawes v. Bennett, has been severely criticised by legal
writers; 20 one writer going so far as to characterize it as a "blot on
the law relating to constructive conversion.""
Another line of cases, which is headed by the principal case of
Estate of Bisbee, have used the doctrine of equitable conversion to
reach a directly opposite result. Using the strict ideas that the con-
version occurs at the exercise of the option, and repudiating the fiction
of relation back, these cases hold that the heir and not the personal
representative is entitled to the purchase money."
The reasoning of the courts should be analyzed in order to de-
termine the true interpretation to be made of the contract of option
which is exercised after the death of the optionor-vendor.
The doctrine of equitable conversion has been based upon several
grounds. "It is sometimes said that equity regards as done what is
agreed to be done; sometimes that from the moment of the contract
the vendor is trustee for the purchaser; sometimes that from the
moment the purchaser is the owner in equity subject of course to a
lien for the unpaid price.""z
Williston scorns such reasoning. He says that he who accepts
the above maxims as reasons for the theory of equitable conversion
"denies himself the effort of further thought."
Keeping in mind our particular problem of option co~tracts, it is
apparent that the maxim that "equity considers as done what ought
to be done" is of no meaning. At the death of the testator, the prop.
' 1 J. and H. 424 (Chancery 1861).
848 Law Q. R. 459, note.
'48 Law Q. R. 459.
" Simpson, supra, note 2, at 564.
,uSweet, Options of Purchase Contained in Leases (1911), 55 Sol.
J. 360, 361.
"Ingraham v. Chandler, 179 Iowa 304, 161 N. W. 434 (1917);
Smith v. Loewenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346, 34 N. E. 159 (1893); see also,
Adams v. Peabody Coal Co., 230 Ill. 469, 82 N. E. 645 (1907).
u2 Williston, Contracts (1921), Sec. 927, p. 1767.
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erty passed to the heir or devisee as realty. There could be no con-
version as yet. Conversion is admittedly based upon a specifically
enforceable contract. The option not having been exercised, as yet
there was no contract of sale in fact which could be specifically en-
forced. The maxim is of as much value as an argument against, as
for equitable conversion. Up until the exercise of the option there is
nothing that "ought to be done." When the option is exercised some-
thing ought to be done, but just to state the maxim is begging the
question. Only at the exercise of the option does a contract to sell
arise, binding the heirs to convey.1 '
How can we determine what ought to be done? As between the
heir and the personal representative, who should have the rights and
who should have the obligations formerly held by the testator?
In rejecting the rule of Lawes v. Bennett, in so far as it gave a
retroactive effect to the exercise of the option, the court in Estate of
Bisbee, said: "The doctrine of equitable conversion rests on the pre-
sumed intention of the owner of the property, and on the maxim that
equity regards as done what ought to be done." As illustrative of
the possibility of the arbitrary application of the maxim, we see that
the court in the instant ease reached a contrary result to Lawes v.
Bennett, on presumed intention. The court said that the lessor must
in reason be presumed to have intended that the discharge of the duty
to convey should take effect for all purposes only from the date when
the duty became absolute upon the occurrence of an uncertain event.
In analyzing the maxim of equity, regarding as done what ought
to be done, presumed intention of the parties, and the fiction of rela-
tion back, the danger of using such to base property rights Is clearly
seen in the determination of who receives the purchase money at the
exercise of the option after the death of the optionor. The fallacy of
the argument giving the purchase money to the personal representa-
tive lies in failing to distinguish between right and obligation. The
testator had an obligation to convey the land if, and when, the
optionee exercised the option. Before the exercise of the option the
testator had no right to receive the purchase money. I-row can it be
conceivable that a personal representative can have greater rights
than the testator?' What the owner does have at the time of his
death Is "realty which is subject to being changed into personalty by
the option holder."' The heir who takes the land has also the obliga-
tion to convey.
The payment of money by the vendee is not to be received out
of right; nor, conversely, is it paid by the vendee under an obliga-
tion. The vendee is merely desirous of obtaining the land. In order
to get the land to whom does he give the money? To the heir who
14Walsh, Equity (1930), p. 417. Hart, The Inconsistencies of the
Doctrine of Equitable Conversion (1908), 24 Law Q. R. 403, 406.
m Clark, Principles of Equity (1919), 149; 24 L. Q. Rev. 407; Lang-
dell, A Brief Survey of Equitable Jurisdiction (1908), page 271.
' Clark, op. cit., supra, note 15, at 147.
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has the land, of course. Equity will not compel the heir to convey
without receiving money, for he is in the same position as his an-
cestor. The heir must not be held absolutely while the ancestor was
held only conditionally."
Also it is admitted by the weight of authority that where an ex-
press option has been exercised after the death of the testator (the
optionor), the purchase money will go to the executor as against
the general devisee." Is this result not inconsistent with the disposition
of the rents and profits pending the option? The fiction of relation
back here is used to give the purchase money to the personal repre-
sentative, but is not used by the majority of authorities in regard to
the rents and profits. There is obvious inconsistency in the applica-
tion of the doctrine of relation back."2
Stone and Langdell condemn the fiction of relation back. It is
true that fictions are of use in the law, but in the words of Stone
"no case will be found in the books where courts have made use of
a fiction for the purpose of divesting rights deemed to have been
honestly acquired.""
Langdell says that the use of the fiction of relation back in this
situation is not justifiable for here it is not even "promotive of
justice."'' "Nobody defends the doctrine; every member of the court
admits, with rueful candor, that in the case before them it defeats
the intention of the testator and deprives legatees of benefits which
they ought to enjoy."'
If we shall accept that the doctrine of relation back is a mean-
ingless fiction, and if we adopt the logic that there was no right
which devolved to the personal representative upon the death of the
optionor we may turn from the individual claims of the heir and
personal representatives, and look at the situation with a broader
view. It is a self-evident fact, according to the court in CharZles 3.
Smit. Co. v. And-erson," that the doctrine of Lawes v. Bennett, involv-
ing relation back "would lead to serious inconvenience and embar-
rassment in the settlement of estates and to complications concerning
title to land attended upon a long-deferred conversion." This case is
in accord with the result reached in the present trend of cases as
illustrated by the principle case of Bstate of Bisbee. "If the option
is not exercised until after the death of the optionor, there is in the
United States, no conversion."" This statement is another way of
saying that the land will devolve to the heir who will be secure in
holding the land subject only to the same obligation, as did the op-
tionor, to convey upon the exercise of the option.
"I'Langdell, op cit., supra, note 15, at 272.
"Clark, op. cit., supra, note 15, at 148.
" 24 L. Q. Rev. 408; Clark, op. cit., supra, note 15, at 149.
"1Stone, supra, note 3, at 377.
2 Langdell, op cit., supra, note 15, at 272.
48 L. Q. R. 459.
84 N. J. Eq. 681, 687, 95 At. 358, 361 (1915).
'Simpson, supra, note 2, at p. 564.
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There are no recent cases in Kentucky upon the specific problem.
In as much as this is a moot question, it is submitted that the solu-
tion reached herein should be adopted in Kentucky.
In summary, it is suggested that the solution of the rights and
duties of the parties involved in the situations of optionor, optionee,
heir, and personal representative of the optionor are to be determined
not by a phrase of magical import as equitable conversion, equitable
conversion with relation back, or devolution of decedent's property.w
These phrases may be useful in the discussion of the problem, and
are helpful as handles for carrying the theories involved, but they
are confusing in application if considered "as a reason for a decision
rather than a mere name for the result of a decision. 'm
It is submitted that the case which is presented for decision be
tested by the principles of contract and equity; that the case be
broken into its component parts; that an equitable, practical result
providing for the speedy settlement of decedent-optionors' estates be
reached. After that, there would be no objection to christening the
brain child equitable conversion.
The principle case, Estate of Bisbee, gives an equitable result,
which no matter if it is called equitable conversion without relation
back, affords a just settlement of the claims of the litigants as prove-
able by sound equitable and contract principles, and as favorable to a
policy of speedy settlement of decedents' estates.
A summary of the situations of the parties of an option to buy
real estate follows. At the making of the option contract the vendor
has legal title to the land pending the exercise of the option. He holds
the land under the obligation to convey to the purchaser at the
instance of the latter's exercise of the option. The vendor has no en-
forceable right. The purchaser has an equitable right to exercise his
option,-to tender the purchase price, and receive the land in return.
If the purchaser does exercise the option before the death of the
vendor, he has the equitable right to receive the land, which may be
specifically enforced in equity. The vendor receives the right to the
purchase money. The heir of the vendor received by the devolution
of decedent's real estate the land subject to the same obligation as
imposed on it during the life of the vendor, and is required to convey
to the purchaser. The vendor died possessing a right to the purchase
money. Such right, being personal, devolves to the vendor's personal
representative. The purchaser if forced to go into equity to get
specific enforcement of the contract will join the heir and the per-
2 See Stone, op cit., supra, note 3, at 379. Stone dislikes the equit-
able conversion theory. He explains the situation by devolution of
decedents' property theory which in effect keeps strict separation of
real and personal property. He allows the personal representative of
the testator to receive the purchase money even though there is no
enforceable right in the testator at death before the exercise of the
option by the optionee.
"Clark, op. cit., supra, note 15, at 149n; see also, 27 Har. L. Rev.
79; 23 Har. L. Rev. 70; 12 Col. L. Rev. 155.
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sonal representative of the vendor, the former to convey the land, the
latter receiving the money. The rights of all parties may be settled in
the one action.
In the event that the vendor had died before the exercise of the
option by the purchaser, the land would have gone to the heir as
above. But there would be a difference in the disposition of the pur-
chase money. The vendor having died without acquiring a right to
the purchase money, the personal representative would receive no
right to it. The heir, rather, would receive the purchase money,
upon carrying out the obligation of conveyance imposed on the land
descending to him.0
GzoanG T. Sxnxmm
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-FALSE CHARGE OF LEWD AND
LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT AS CONSTITUTING CRUELTY A GROUND
FOR DIVORCE.
During a recent bar examination in this state, a question was put
to those taking the examination which had reference to cruelty as a
ground for divorce in Kentucky. The question was apparently taken
from a late Kentucky case, where the facts appear as follows. A wife
instituted an action for divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman
treatment. By answer and counterclaim the defendant husband
traversed the allegations of the wife's petition and also asked for a
divorce, charging that the wife had been guilty of such acts of im-
morality and lewd and lascivious conduct as proved her to be un-
chaste-that within six months before their separation she had been
guilty of adultery. Such charges were also proved to have been made
by the husband outside the court room. The charges were not sus-
tained. The question was whether the charges of conjugal misconduct
made by the husband against his wife, would, if unfounded and not in
good faith, warrant the granting of a divorce on the grounds of cruel
and inhuman treatment. The trial court answered the interrogatory
in the affirmative and granted an absolute divorce to the petitioner.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines cruelty as between husband and
wife as, "those acts which affect the life, the health, or even the com-
fort of the party aggrieved, and give a reasonable apprehension of
bodily hurt."
The weight of authority is that conduct, in order to constitute
cruelty, and thus come within the statutes of the various states, must
consist in the infliction or threatened infliction of bodily harm. This
-T Upon the problem see 16 R. C. L., p. 806; 13 C. J., pp. 856-858;
also, the annotations in 57 L. R. A. 643, L. R. A. 1916 F 358, 50 A. L. R.
1314.
Bus v. Bush , 245 Ky. 172, 53 S. W., (2d) 352 (1932).
